Circumventing the Supremacy Clause?
Understanding the Constitutional
Implications of the United States'

Treatment of Treaty Obligations
Through an Analysis of the
New York Convention*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

II.

Ill.

IN TRODU CTION ..................................................................................................
A.
The CriticalRole of InternationalAgreements in
FurtheringInternationalRelations ..........................................................
B.
The CriticalRole ofArbitration in Furthering
InternationalCommercial Relations........................................................
C.
United States ProtectionistPolicies Challenge
the Promotion of InternationalCommercial Relationships .....................
D.
Understandingthe New York Convention................................................
THE UNITED STATES AND TREATY OBLIGATIONS ...............................................
A.
Trend of U.S. Treatment of Treaties: From the
CharmingBetsy Doctrine to the HeadMoney
Cases- And Back Again? ........................................................................
B.
United States Treaty Obligationsin Modern Times:
IncreasingWillingness to Violate InternationalAgreements ...................
THE NEW YORK CONVENTION ...........................................................................
A.
Article V. The Force Behind Uniform Enforcement
ofA rbitralA w ards ...................................................................................
B.
The FederalArbitration Act: Article V11"s Vehicle
for ImportingDomestic Law Into InternationalDisputes........................

492
492
493
494
495
499

499
502
506
506
508

*
J.D. candidate 2006, University of San Diego School of Law; B.B.A. 2003,
University of Michigan.

C.
D.
IV .

Recent FederalCase Law: The Preferencefor Article
V or VII Depends on Which Provision Favors
Domestic Citizens and Businesses ...........................................................
Where Are We After Chromalloy, Baker and Spier? ................................

Is THERE A SOLUTION? ..................................

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

.... ... .... .... ... ... ... .. .... ... ... ... .... ... ... ..

InternationalComity and the Debate Over
Who Should Have ControllingAuthority .................................................
The U.S. Constitutionand Enforcement of Treaty
ObligationsandInternationalAgreements ..............................................
A Ploy to Exploit Article VII of the New York
Convention? The Later-in-Time Rule Revisited .......................................
Article V More Effectively PromotesInternational
Arbitration andInternationalCommercial Transactions ........................
What Now ? ..............................................................................................

510
513
. 515

515
516
516
519
520

I. INTRODUCTION

A. The CriticalRole of InternationalAgreements in
FurtheringInternationalRelations
The United States' participation in treaties and other international
agreements is becoming more necessary and an increasingly prevalent
occurrence as a result of globalization. The rapid pace of technological
innovation and more effective means of transportation have caused our
world to shrink, making countries even more interconnected. The
corresponding explosion of international business and commercial
transactions has resulted in high levels of risk and uncertainty due to a
complex mix of laws, monetary factors, politics and cultures that vary
across countries.' For global players, it has become essential to have
international agreements that can mitigate the risks inherent in
international commercial transactions. Accordingly, the United States
and other international states continually adapt to changing conditions
by creating international agreements, inter alia, NAFTA, GATT, the
Vienna Convention, the Geneva Convention and The New York
Convention. As the world becomes increasingly reliant on treaties,
international agreements and trade agreements, the United States must
become more vigilant in upholding such agreements.

1.
KATHERINE LYNCH, THE FORCES OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: CHALLENGES
TO THE REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 3-4 (THE HAGUE: Kluwar

Law International 2003).
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B. The CriticalRole ofArbitration in Furthering
InternationalCommercial Relations
International trade agreements are a particularly dynamic area where
international relations are increasing as a result of globalization. Of
course, conflict between and among countries is bound to arise in the
course of free trade and international commercial transactions. International
litigation is of particular importance in resolving such disputes.
However, jurisdictional problems can arise as parties may be legally
subject to the judicial systems of more than one country. This leads to
judicial inefficiency, increasing costs, and uncertainty in enforcing
judgments. 2 As a result, international arbitration has become more
prevalent as a way of mitigating these problems. Arbitration clauses are
routinely used in commercial transaction agreements, making arbitration
3
a standard means of resolving international commercial disputes.
When parties to commercial agreements contract to resolve disputes
through international arbitration, contractual clauses generally specify
the location in which the arbitration will be held and the law that will be
used to resolve the dispute.4
However, problems arise when the
prevailing party, seeking to enforce an international arbitration judgment
rendered in one country, must go to another country to have the
judgment recognized.5 The United Nations Convention on the Recognition6
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention)
currently provides the primary vehicle for the enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards.7 Article III of the New York Convention provides that
2. Id. at 4-6.
3. Stephen T. Ostrowski & Yuval Shany,

Note: Chromolloy: United States Law
andInternationalArbitration at the Crossroads,73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1650 (1998).
4. The laws of the country under which the parties agree to resolve their conflict
may not necessarily be the country where the parties agree to arbitrate. For example, the
parties may agree to arbitrate in England using the laws of France.
5. Kenneth R. Davis, Unconventional Wisdom: A New Look at Articles V and VII
of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 37

TEX. INT'L L.J. 43, 46 (2002) (discussing arbitration proceedings between a Japanese and
a Columbian company taking place in Japan and the Columbian Company seeks to have
a Columbian court enforce the judgment).
6. The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 38 U.N.T.S. 330.

7.

JULIAN

D.M LEW

ET AL.,

COMPARATIVE

INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL

ARBITRATION 693 (The Hague: Kluwar Law International 2003); see generally The New
York Convention (The New York Convention was ratified by the United Nations in
1958; the United States became a signatory to The New York Convention in 1970; 122
countries are currently signatory to the New York Convention).

"each contracting state shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and
enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory
where the award is relied upon." 8 Thus, countries that are signatories to
the New York convention agree to uphold arbitration judgments that are
brought to their country for recognition. 9 The international arbitration
regimes' success depends on a precedent of signatories upholding arbitral
awards. The New York Convention provides the framework to this
end.'o0
C. United States ProtectionistPolicies Challenge the Promotion of
InternationalCommercialRelationships
Unfortunately, the courts of the United States are impeding the spread
of international arbitration as a way to resolve commercial disputes. In
recent years, the United States has failed to uphold treaty obligations and
other international agreements to which it is a signatory." Examples
include the failure of the United States to pay U.N. dues during the
1990s and until 2001, and its failure to advise alien prisoners of their12
consular rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
Additionally, the United States has shown an increasing willingness to
13
impose protectionist measures to support its domestic industries.
These measures violate the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). 14 This is evidenced by President Bush's invocation of the
Safeguards Agreement of GATT to protect domestic steelmakers. 15
Emerging case law in the U.S. federal courts has contributed to this
problem by offering conflicting interpretations of the New York
Convention. Federal courts are invoking Article VII of the New York
Convention in order to justify the application of domestic law in place of
the international law stipulated by the New York Convention.' 6 These
8. NEW YORK CONVENTION art. III.
9. Lew, supra note 7, at 693-94.
10. Id.at 22.
11. Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and Its Treaties: Observance and Breach,
95 AM.J. INT'L L. 313 (2001).
12. Id.
13. Ari Afilalo, Not in My Backyard: Power and Protectionism in US Trade
Policy, 34 N.Y.U. J.INT'L L. 749, 752 (2002) (stating that the approach of the United
States to international trade conflicts with the general direction of economic
globalization because the United States is motivated by their power rather than rules to
achieve what they believe to be a desired state of affairs).
14. Id. at 751-52 (GATT is a 'free trade policy, that was established after World
War II, whereby global tariffs on trade would be gradually removed and other
protectionist policies eliminated).
15. Id.
16. Davis, supra note 5, at 47; see also Erica Smith, Vacated Arbitral Awards:
Recognition and Enforcement Outside the Countrv of Origin, 20 B.U. INT'L L. J. 355,
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cases include In re Chromolloy Aeroservices, Baker Marine v. Chevron
and Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica.17 This treatment of international
agreements and trade contracts evidences a U.S. policy of protecting
domestic citizens and businesses. While potentially profitable in the
short run for the United States, this behavior comes at the expense of
weakening the United States' leadership and relationships with
international actors.
The approach taken by the legislative, executive and judicial branches
of the U.S. government creates a danger that the United States will evade
its obligations under the New York Convention. In effect, domestic law
is substituting for the international law set forth in the New York
Convention. This, in turn, will weaken the Supremacy Clause1 8 of the
U.S. Constitution, which enumerates treaties as the supreme law of the land.
An unyielding preference for domestic law will also impair commercial
relationships with other countries that are signatories to treaties with the
United States. To avoid such negative consequences and foster international
relations, the United States must pursue a policy of upholding arbitral
awards. Doing so will ensure the United States retains a position of
leadership and respect in creating and enforcing future international
agreements.
D. Understandingthe New York Convention
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the New York
Convention encompasses two important goals. 19 First, the Convention
encourages the recognition and enforcement 0 of commercial arbitration
357 n.6 (2002) (Article VII provides a "more favorable law" provision that allows a
party to avail itself of the national arbitral law of the country where recognition and
enforcement is sought).
17. Davis, supra note 5, at 47.
18. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (This Constitution, and the laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be
Supreme Law of the land; and the Judges in every state shall be bound thereby,
any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding.).
19. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 508-09, 520 n.15 (1974) (the
Supreme Court denied Alberto-Culver's attempt to litigate in a United States District
Court and upheld an arbitration clause between Alberto-Culver (American corporation)
and a German toiletries manufacturer, Scherk, whereby the parties agreed to resolve
disputes in France under the law of Illinois).
20. An "enforcement" action usually involves a party armed with an award
seeking to collect a sum of money from the party defeated in a foreign arbitration

21

agreements in international contracts.
Such agreements are enforced
through Article III of The Convention, which provides that signatory
countries must recognize and enforce arbitral awards.2 2 Second, the
Convention seeks to unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate
are observed and arbitral awards are enforced2 3 Such consistency is
enforced through Article V of the New York Convention, which provides
very limited defenses against, and exceptions to, the enforcement of
arbitral awards.24 These underlying tenets of the New York Convention
are intended to both encourage international arbitration practices and
prevent forum shopping.
However, the aforementioned goals of the New York Convention face
defeat by the very provisions of the Convention: Articles V and VII
conflict and contradict each other.26 Article VII provides that an arbitral
award is enforceable to the full extent of the laws of the country where
enforcement is sought.2 7 A party seeking to enforce an arbitration award
is therefore entitled to all of the rights prescribed by the law of the
country where enforcement is sought, even if those rights are not
provided for in the New York Convention. 28 This language opens the
door for the U.S. judiciary to use domestic law in place of the laws set
forth in the New York Convention when a dispute regarding an arbitral
award comes before a U.S. court.
By contrast, Article V provides seven limited exceptions upon which a
signatory country may refuse to enforce an arbitral award. 29 The intent
proceeding (or other court proceeding). Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States 481, cmt. D, 596 (1987).
21. Id.; see also NEW YORK CONVENTION art. III.
22. NEW YORK CONVENTION, art. III (Article III of the New York Convention
states that "each Contracting Stated shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and
enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award
is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the following articles").
23. Id.; see also NEW YORK CONVENTION art. V.
24.

See generally NEW YORK CONVENTION art. V.

25. Ostrowski, supra note 3, at 1657; see also Hamid F. Gharavi, Chromalloy:
Another View, 12 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 21, 21-22 (1997) (forum shopping occurs
when parties purposely try to arbitrate in a forum where arbitral awards can more easily
be overturned under local law).
26. Davis, supra note 5, at 46. See also Smith, supra note 16 (regarding Article
VII as a "more favorable law" provision).
27. Davis, supra note 5, at 46; See generally NEW YORK CONVENTION art. VII.
28. Baker Marine Ltd. v. Chevron Ltd., 191 F. 3d 194, 196 (2d Cir. 1999).
29.

NEW YORK CONVENTION, ARTICLE V. Article V of the New York Convention

provides as follows:
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of
the party against whom it is invoked only if that party furnishes to the
competent authority where the recognition is sought, proof that:
a.
The parties to the agreement referred to article II were, under the law

applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not
valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing
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of Article V is to limit the grounds upon which a court can base its
refusal to uphold an arbitral award. 30 Because none of the grounds for
refusal are mandatory, a country may still choose to enforce the arbitral
award.3 1 For example, Article V(1)(e), a particularly important refusal
provision, provides a court in the rendering country, or a country under
the laws of which the award is made, with the authority to annul the
arbitral award.32 This allows for the local enforcement standards of the
rendering country to come into play.33
As will be discussed infra, the current trend among countries,
including the United States, is to follow the tenets of Article V by
upholding arbitral agreements rendered in a foreign country and rarely

b.
c.

d.

any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award
was made; or
The party against whom the award is invoked was not given property
notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling
within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains
decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration,
provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can
be separate from those not so submitted, that part of the award which
contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be
recognized and enforced; or

The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was
not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such
agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where
the arbitration took place; or
e.
The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set
aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which,
or under the law of which, that award was made.
2.
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the
competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is
sought finds that:
a.
The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under the law of that country; or
b. The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the
public policy of that country.
30. See supra note 24.
31. Xiaowen Qui, Enforcing Arbitral Awards Involving Foreign Parties: A
Comparisonof the United States and China, 11 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 607, 620 (2000).
32. Davis, supra note 5, at 46.
33.
Lew, supra note 7, at 716; see also Alghanim & Sons v. Toys "R" Us, 126
F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 1997) and Spector v. Torenberg, 853 F. Supp. 201 (S.D.N.Y 1994)
(where the Second Circuit noted that Article V(1)(e) of the Convention allows U.S.
courts to apply domestic law to set aside or suspend and arbitral award).

invoking these exceptions.34 However, we are beginning to see a change
in this trend in the U.S. federal courts.35
Given the limited grounds for refusing to uphold an arbitral award
under Article V, Article VII is considered to be very controversial
because it augments the power of a country in a different fashion than
Article V. 36 Article VII states that "the provisions of the present
Convention shall not deprive any interested party of any right he may
have to avail himself of an arbitral award in the manner and to the extent
allowed by the law of the country where such award is sought to be
relied upon., 37 This language might allow for the application of a state's
domestic law or treaty when such laws provide for more favorable
rulings.38 Therefore, the laws of the enforcing country may dominate
and control the outcome of the arbitration dispute if they
provide for a
39
more favorable outcome than the New York Convention.
Consequently, the provisions of Article V and VII are in direct
conflict with each other. Article V allows the rendering country to annul
an arbitral award. Article VII allows the enforcing country to override
an Article V annulment, which will generally be based on the local law
of the rendering country, and uphold an arbitral award on the basis of the
more favorable domestic law of the enforcing country. 40 Article VII can
be explained as encouraging greater enforcement of arbitral awards, one
of the goals of the New York Convention, through the use of domestic
law. 41 However, Article VII also has the effect of providing a backdoor
for countries to import domestic law into an international treaty, if doing
so enhances enforceability. It is important to remember, though, that the
exceptions in Article V are specifically limited for the purpose of
.
achieving greater uniformity in arbitral enforcement practice. 42 Therefore,
34. Vagts, supra note 11, at 331.
35. Davis, supra note 5, at 47 (three recent federal court decisions-In re
Chromalloy Aeroservices, Baker Marine v. Chevron, and Spier v. Calzaturificio
Tecnica-have addressed the conflict between Articles V and VII and have emerged
with inconsistent results).
36. Mohamed Taherzadeh, International Arbitration and Enforcement in U.S.
FederalCourts, 22 Hous. J. INT'L. L.J. 371, 386 (2000).
37. NEW YORK CONVENTION, art. VII.
38. Taherzadeh, supra note 36, at 386; See also Matter of Chromalloy
Aeroservices, 939 F. Supp 907 (D.D.C. 1996) (where a United States district court used
Article VII as an avenue and justification for employing domestic law to uphold the validity
of a foreign arbitral award that had previously been nullified by an Egyptian Court).
39. Lew, supra note 7, at 698.
40. See supra notes 13 and 29; see also Matter of Chromalloy Aeroservices, 939 F.
Supp. 907, 914 (D.D.C. 1996) (United States district court upheld the validity of a
foreign arbitral award that had been earlier nullified by a foreign court in the rendering
country).
41. Ostrowski, supra note 3, at 1661.
42. See generallysupra note 24.
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there is a conflict between the goal of enforceability of arbitral decisions,
as reflected
by Article VII, and uniformity in practice, as reflected by
43
Article V.

Ultimately, signatories to the New York Convention need to resolve
this discrepancy and determine which article to apply in the event of
conflict. This Comment shows that U.S. federal courts tend to favor
Article VII at the expense of Article V. This leaves open the opportunity
for the United States to enforce domestic law in place of the New York
Convention international law. This Comment argues that the United States'
foreign and commercial relations would benefit from greater deference
by the United States' international obligations. Such deference would
also help the United States to retain a strong leadership force in the
international realm. Thus, the United States should adopt a policy of
favoring Article V of the New York Convention and respect foreign
review of international commercial arbitration awards.
II.

THE UNITED STATES AND TREATY OBLIGATIONS

A. Trend of U.S. Treatment of Treaties: From the Charming Betsy
Doctrine to the Head Money Cases-And Back Again?
The United States is a party to thousands of treaties and international
agreements."
Admittedly, the small number of treaty violations in
relation to the total number of international agreements suggests that the
United States is not a persistent violator of treaties and generally upholds
its international obligations. 4 When the United States has erred and
breached an obligation under an international agreement, the government
has either taken steps to remedy the breach or has paid fines for its
43. Ostrowski, supra note 3, at 1661-62 (note 51) (additionally, most countries
adhere to the uniform standards laid out in Article VII of the New York Convention.
This is evidenced by the UNCITRAL's Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration, whose laws have been derived from the New York Convention and which
has been adopted by Australia, Bermuda, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Hong Kong,
Mexico, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Scotland, and Tunisia, and is being considered by
the United States, Germany, and New Zealand).
44. Vagts, supra note 11, at 331.
45. Id. (The United States is party to over ten thousand international agreements;
however, the problem stems from how the United States has handled recent treaty
violations). See also CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, S. PRT. 106-71, TREATIES AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 39

(2001) (the congressional research service reports that the United States is party to 600
treaties and nearly 11,000 separate executive agreements).

errors.4 6 In recent years, however, there have been prominent instances
in which the United States has breached its obligation but has not made
efforts to remedy its violations or compensate the injured parties. 47 This
trend can be observed in the following overview of U.S. federal court
cases.
In 1804, the United States Supreme Court, in Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy, established that U.S. courts should construe laterenacted statutes in a manner that does not conflict with or overrule prior
treaties, if such construction is reasonably possible. 48 Under the folds of
Murray, the United States had entered into the Non-Intercourse Act of
1800, which prohibited commercial intercourse between U.S. residents,
and residents of any territory of the French Republic.4 9 An American
citizen, the plaintiff, was intercepted by a public armed ship, operating
under the authority of the President of the United States, while sailing
with goods from the United States to a French island in violation of the
agreement.5 ° Chief Justice Marshall's opinion held that, because the
American citizen was actually domiciled in Denmark, he was not acting
as an American and was not in violation of the agreement. 1 The
Supreme Court construed the commercial activities of an American
citizen in such a manner as to uphold the international agreement.5 2 The
Supreme Court specifically held that acts of Congress should never be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
53
remains. This has come to be known as the CharmingBetsy doctrine.
Despite the Supreme Court's specific charge to uphold international
agreements, about eighty years later the Court began to carve out a new
approach to international agreements. In 1884, the Supreme Court in
Edye v. Robertson (The Head Money Cases) upheld a statute54 entitled
"An act to regulate immigration" that imposed a tax on immigrants of

46. Vagts, supra note 11, at 313, 331.
47. See generally Vagts, supra note 11, at 313 (instead or remedying their actions
the legislative, executive and judicial branches have justified their actions by relying on
the doctrine describing the "later-in-time" rule where domestic statutes enacted after
prior international agreements take precedent, thus, giving less credence to the binding
effect of international law).
48. Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) (thus, the Supreme
Court did not give effect to a later-in-time rule, whereby later-enacted domestic statutes
are allowed to override treaty provisions).
49. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 1804 U.S. Lexis 252, ***24-25.
50. Murray, 6 U.S. at 116.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 120-21 (the Supreme Court held that, although claimant was an American
citizen, he acquired commercial privileges that were attached to his domicile in
Denmark, rather that to his country of citizenship).
53. Id. at 118; Vagts, supra note 11, at 322.
54. Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 599-600 (1884).
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fifty cents per person.55 This statute was in violation of various treaties
between the United States and foreign powers in peace, amity and
commerce.5 6 The Court stated that a treaty is not irrepealable or
unchangeable, and that the Constitution gives it no superiority over an
Act of Congress. Congress may therefore repeal or modify a treaty by
enacting an Act at a later date.5 7 This view of the authority of Congress
to give greater deference to domestic
58 law than to a treaty became known
as the Head Money Cases doctrine.
Interestingly, on the same day that the Head Money Cases were
decided, the Supreme Court also decided Chew Heong v. United States,
which followed the approach of the Charming Betsy doctrine.59 In Chew
Heong, the plaintiff, who was residing in the United States, left in 1881
and then sought to return in 1884.60 He was denied entrance into the
United States on the basis of the Chinese Restriction Act, signed into
62
power by Congress in 1882.61 The Supreme Court declined to enforce
the provisions of the later-enacted Chinese Restriction Act 63 in favor of
respecting a treaty obligation between the United States and China,
which was intended to encourage commerce and foreign relations
between the two countries. 64
As a result of the Chew Heong and Charming Betsy cases, the
Supreme Court has provided strong authority dating back to the 1800's
to resolve conflicting laws by favoring treaty obligations over domestic
law. However, this line of cases stands in direct conflict with the
Head Money Cases, which upholds domestic law at the expense of
international law. Interestingly, to date neither the Charming Betsy
doctrine nor the Head Money Cases have been overturned. Following
the Chew Heong case, though, the Charming Betsy doctrine became the
more prevalent view, with the courts interpreting statutes to conform to
65
treaties.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 586.
Id. at 588.
Id. at 598-99.

58.

Vagts, supra note 11, at 316.

59. Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884).
60. Id. at 538.
61. Id. at 538.
62. Id. at 580.
63. Id. at 538.
64. Id. at 541-42.
65. Vagts, supra note 11, at 318 (for example, in 1914, the Supreme Court held in
Rainey v. United States that if there were a conflict between a new tax on Americans'

More recently, however, U.S. courts have changed their approach,
favoring instead the later-in-time approach of the Head Money Cases.66
Under a later-in-time rule, later-enacted statutes have greater effect than
prior-enacted treaties.6 7 Such an approach encourages and provides an
excuse for courts to import domestic law into disputes where
international agreements are involved. This Comment contends that
such a trend creates a danger whereby countries, such as the United States,
will enact domestic laws that will overrule treaties and international
agreements for the express purpose of evading the obligations contained
therein. Needless to say, this new attitude of the United States,
combined with the later-in-time rule, will have a negative effect on the
United States' foreign relations with other countries. Courts will have
traded short-term gains for long-term distrust of foreign powers and
commercial enterprises.
B. United States Treaty Obligationsin Modern Times: Increasing
Willingness to Violate InternationalAgreements
A recent and prominent breach of the United States' international
obligations occurred during the 1990s when the United States withheld
full dues owed to the United Nations. 68 In defending the position of the
United States, Senator Jesse Helms, the chair of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, explained that "treaty obligations can be superseded
by a simple act of Congress., 69 He further asserted that "when the
United States joins a treaty organization, it holds no legal authority over
us., 70 It was not until 1999 that the United States signed legislation that
authorized payments of $926 million in arrears and assessments to the
United Nations. However, the United States attached conditions to each

use of foreign-built yachts and an 1815 treaty with Britain that the tax law would
certainly prevail).
66. Id. at313.
67. Id.; See also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (the Supreme
Court explained that where a treaty and an act of congress relate to the same subject, the
courts will attempt to interpret them in a manner which will give effect to both; however,
if it is not possible to do so without violating the language of one or both provisions
because they are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other).
68. Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
InternationalLaw States and International Organizations:Agreement on UN Financial
and Structural Reforms, 95 AJIL 387, 389-90 (2001) (the United States unilaterally
decided not to fully fund the United Nations assessment to the United States for
peacekeeping operations).
69. Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
InternationalLaw States and InternationalOrganizations:Senator Helms Addresses UN
Security Council, 94 AJIL 348, 352 (2000).
70. Id. at 352.
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payment. 7' Although an appropriate interpretation of Article XVII of the
U.N. Charter relating to budgetary authority has been contested,7 2 a 1962
Advisory Opinion made clear that the U.N. General Assembly has the
power to impose payment obligations on member states. 73 Therefore,
the United States' failure to pay United Nations dues was a violation of
the U.N. Charter.74 The United States' withholding of dues not only created
resentment from other member states, but resulted in other negative
consequences to the United States as well.75 Clearly, such actions tarnish
the image of the United States, thereby diminishing its ability to act as 76a
leader in the negotiation of future multilateral international agreements.
Another recent and significant treaty violation occurred in 1998 when
the United States Supreme Court invoked the later-in-time rule in Breard
v. Greene.77 The plaintiff in Breard v. Greene, a prison inmate from
Paraguay about to be executed, argued that his conviction and sentence
should be overturned because of violations of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (the "Vienna Convention"). 78 The Vienna Convention,
in effect since 1969, 79 provides that arresting authorities must advise a
foreign national of his/her right to inform his/her national consulate of an
arrest, conviction or sentence. 80 The Supreme Court, however, denied
habeas corpus and certiorari and held that the Antiterrorism and
8
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 overrides the Vienna Convention. 1
The Court barely considered, and gave no deference to, the international

71.
See Murphy, supra note 68, at 389-90 (e.g., reduction of the percentage of the
United States' assessment for regular United Nations expenses and United Nations

peacekeeping expenses).
72. Article XVII, paragraph (2) of the United Nations Charter states that "the
expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the
General Assembly."
73.
Stacey Williams, A Billion Dollar Donation:Should the UnitedNations Look a
Gift Horse in the Mouth?, 27 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L 425,437 (1999).
74. American Society of InternationalLaw Proceedings, March 24-27, 1999: UN
FiscalCrises Brought On By US Arrears,93 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 150, 152 (1999).
75.
Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
InternationalLaw, 94 AJIL 348 (2000) (two significant consequences for the United

States are as follows: (1) a United States representative was not elected in 1996 to a
traditional seat on the biennial budget committee, and (2) the size of the arreage raised
the possibility that the United States would lose its vote on the General Assembly).
76. Id. at 352.
77. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
78. Id. at 373.
79. Id. at 376.
80. Vagts, supra note 11, at 320.
81. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376.

treaty . 82 Instead, the Court looked to U.S. law, stating that procedural
rules of a forum State govern the implementation of a treaty in that
state.83
Another example of the United States government favoring laterenacted domestic statutes is the Congressional enactment of amendments
to the Internal Revenue Code as a means to override tax treaty
obligations. 84 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 led to a major change in
U.S. policy with respect to tax treaties with other countries.85 Initially,
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 had provided that tax treaties
would prevail over Code provisions. 86 But in 1988, the Technical and
Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 significantly amended basic Code
provisions governing treaty relationships, so that treaties were no longer
given preferential treatment over Code provisions. 87 The Technical and
Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 has since been vigorously used to
override many treaty obligations between the United States and other
countries.88 For example, in Lindsey v. Commissioner, the tax court
subjected petitioner, a U.S. citizen in Switzerland, to double-taxation,
contrary to a tax treaty between the United States and Switzerland,
89
because the Tax Code limited the application of the foreign tax credit.
Kenneth Gideon, former Assistant Secretary of Treasury, has stated that
it is important for the United States to uphold tax treaties it negotiates
with other countries; otherwise foreign countries will become far less
willing to negotiate treaties that are favorable for the United States. 90
In the arena of international business and commercial transactions, the
Steel Case illustrates the use of the Safeguards Agreement, contained
within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), by the
United States to escape international obligations under GATT. 9 l The
82. Id. at 375 (the Supreme Court stated that the argument that the Vienna
Convention was the "supreme law of the land" and trumps the procedural default
doctrine was "plainly" incorrect).
83. Id. (The Supreme Court stated that while "respectful consideration" should be
given to the interpretation of an international treaty in an international court, absent an
express provision to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum state are what
govern).
84. Vagts, supra note 11, at 320.
85. David Sachs, The Tax Lawyer, Is the 19th Century Doctrine of Treaty Override
Good Law for Modern Day Tax Treaties?, 47 TAx LAW 867 (1994).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Lindsey v. Commissioner, 98 TC 672, 673-74 (1992).
90. Sachs, supra note 85, at 867.
91. Afilalo, supra note 13, at 751-52, 758 (GATT was adopted in 1947, in large
part a result of World War II, in order to advocate a free trade policy. GATT aims to
eliminate the protectionist policies of member countries in order to foster increased
commerce and cross-border consumption between trading partners. The Steel Case
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Safeguards Agreement, enacted in 1994, allows World Trade Organization
(WTO) member countries to protect a specific domestic industry from
increasing imports of any product that is causing, or threatening to
cause, serious injury to that industry.92 In 2002, President Bush invoked
the Safeguards Agreement and imposed tariffs for a three-year period on
steel.9 3 As a result, the United States faced sanctions from the WTO
when at least ten countries filed suits against the United States for
violating GATT.94 The complaints asserted that the domestic problems
of the steelmakers were insufficient to invoke the Safeguards Agreement
and advance domestic interests over international treaty obligations.9 5 In
response to the United States' use of the Safeguards Agreement to
advance domestic policies over the free trade policies under GATT, the
United Nations has declared that the decision
' 96 of the United States "is a
major setback for the world trading system. ,
The treatment of international agreements by the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches of the United States government, as evidenced by
the failure to pay United Nations dues, the tax cases and the Steel Case,
reflects two trends. First, the United States is invoking the later-in-time rule
and relying on domestic law at the expense of treaty obligations with
greater frequency. Second, the United States is following an overzealous
protectionist approach to international trade law that is also a violation
of international trade agreements. These two trends suggest the United
States' future approach to the New York Convention and to international
commercial agreements.
The next portion of this Comment will analyze U.S. case law
interpreting and applying the provisions of the New York Convention.
The analysis depicts a movement away from the early cases, where the

refers to the imposition by the Bush administration of tariffs on foreign steel pursuant to
the Safeguards Agreement).
92. Id. at 766-67 (this allows the domestic government to give temporary relief to
the effected domestic industry; when trade patterns cause a member country to
experience dramatic and sudden injury, the Safegaurds Agreement provides a legal
avenue by which the government is allowed to suspend trade obligations and impose
temporary tariffs in excess of agreed upon levels).
93. Id. at 770, 773-74 (sixteen United States steelmakers had been operating under
the protection of the bankruptcy courts and applied to the President for industry
protection because of an influx of imports of steel products).
94. Id. at 774-75.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 775-76 (quoting Neil King, Jr., & Geoff Winestock, Plan to Rescue Steel
Industry Draws Fire,WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2002, at A3).

courts upheld the application of the New York Convention. The most
recent cases interpreting the New York Convention reflect the growing
tendency of the courts to uphold domestic law in place of international
law where international commercial arbitration agreements are involved.
The trends above evidence a very real danger that U.S. courts will
invoke Article VII of the New York Convention and apply domestic law,
in violation of international law, on a more frequent basis.
III. THE NEW YORK CONVENTION
A. Article V: The Force Behind Uniform Enforcement
ofArbitral Awards
Early Supreme Court cases reviewing international arbitration agreements
generally enforced non-domestic awards rendered in the United States.97
Upholding arbitral awards domestically effectively furthers the goal of
international enforcement of arbitral awards. In these early cases, the
Supreme Court laid down important policy considerations for following
Article VII of the New York Convention and enforcing arbitral awards.
In M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., an American oil company
contracted with a German towing company to tow an oil rig from
Louisiana to Italy. 98 The contract included a forum selection clause by
which any dispute was to be tried before the London Court of Justice. 99
The Court rejected an Article V(2)(b) argument that the arbitration
provision contravened the public policy of the forum and upheld the
arbitration clause.100 The Supreme Court explained that in order for
American businesses to expand throughout the world, the United States
must not insist that all disputes be resolved in U.S. courts and under its
laws, but rather must concede to the use of a neutral forum.' 0 '
In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., an American Corporation contracted
to purchase three business entities and trademarks for cosmetics goods
from a German businessman.' 0 2 The Court upheld a forum selection
clause to litigate any disputes before the International Chamber of
Commerce in Paris using the laws of Illinois.10 3 The Supreme Court's
decision rested on the policy argument that upholding contractual forum
selection clauses was an indispensable precondition to achieving the
orderliness and predictability essential to international business
97.
98.

99.
100.
101.

Qiu, supra note 31, at 623.
M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 2 (1972).

Id.
Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 11-12.

102.

Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 508 (1974).

103.

Id. at 520-21.
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transactions. 10 4 The Court reasoned that forum selection clauses avoid
the danger that the dispute might be submitted to a forum adverse to the
interests of one of the parties. 0 5
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., a
Japanese car manufacturer engaged in a joint venture to distribute cars
through a Puerto Rican corporation. 106 The Supreme Court upheld an
arbitration clause 0 7 that provided for resolution of disputes in accordance
with the rules and regulations of the Japan Commercial Arbitration
Association. 1 8 The Court relied on a policy reflecting concerns for
international comity and respect for the capacities of foreign and
transnational tribunals in reaching its holding. 0 9 The Court further stated
that sensitivity to the need for predictability in the resolution of disputes
in the international commercial system required it to enforce the
arbitration clause." 10
The Second Circuit has followed the Supreme Court's example in
providing important policy considerations for the enforcement of arbitral
awards. In Parsons& Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe GeneraleDe
L 'IndustrieDu Papier,the Second Circuit affirmed an arbitration award
in favor of an Egyptian government-owned corporation against an
American engineering firm that abandoned a project to construct a
paper mill."
The Court's decision was based on the overriding
policy consideration of reciprocity that counseled courts to invoke
Article V defenses with caution." 2 The Court was concerned that foreign
courts would frequently utilize these defenses as a basis for refusing to
uphold arbitral awards." 3
In summary, the foregoing policies that weigh in favor of upholding
arbitral awards are, inter alia, the expansion of commercial activity of
American businesses throughout the world, the achievement of orderliness
and predictability in international commercial transactions, respect for
104.

Id. at 516.

105. Id.
106. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 616-17
(1985).
107. Id. at 640.
108. Id. at 617.
109. Id. at 629.
110. Id.
111. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale De L'Industrie Du
Papier, 508 F. 2d 969, 972 (2d Cir. 1974).
112. Id. at 973-74.
113. Id.

judicial decisions rendered in foreign countries, and the avoidance of
forum shopping.
B. The FederalArbitrationAct. Article VII's Vehicle for Importing
Domestic Law Into InternationalDisputes
As the previous section illustrates, the majority of case law reflects a
trend in U.S. courts to uphold the provisions of the New York
Convention and to enforce arbitral agreements. However, recent case
law out of the federal circuit courts has produced opinions that indicate a
preference for domestic law over international treaty obligations through
the use of the later-in-time doctrine.1 14 A brief discussion of the United
States Federal Arbitration Act is warranted to comprehend the interplay
of the relevant United States domestic law." 5
The Federal Arbitration Act (hereinafter referred to as the "FAA") sets
out the domestic rules of arbitral law for the United States." 6 Chapter
One, Section 10 of the FAA enumerates four grounds upon which
federal courts may vacate or modify arbitral awards: excess of arbitral
authority; arbitrator misconduct; evident partiality; and fraud." 7 In
addition, federal case law has implied three additional grounds for the
denial of arbitral awards: manifest disregard of the law;"' an arbitrary
and capricious or irrational award;" 9 and violation of public policy. 2 '

114. Davis, supra note 5, at 47 (the most notable and controversial cases concerning
this issue include In re Chromalloy Aeroservices, Baker Marine v. Chevron, and Spier v.
Calzaturificio Tecnica).
115. It should be noted that the New York Convention is a non-self-executing
treaty. Treaties that are non-self-executing require implementation by Congress to take
effect as domestic law where the international agreement would achieve what lies within
the exclusive law-making power of Congress under the Constitution. LonJ F. DAMROSCH
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS

206 (West Publishing Co. 2001)

(1980). As such, the United States Federal Arbitration Act is the domestic legislation
that gives effect to the New York Convention in the United States.
116. Id. at 68 (the Federal Arbitration Act was enacted in 1925 and later amended in
1970 when the United States ratified the New York Convention).
117. Id.; see also Qiu, supra note 31, at 620-21.
118. Rodriguez v. Prudential, 882 F. Supp. 1202, 1209 (D.P.R. 1995) (the District
Court explained that the "manifest disregard" of the law language derives from the
United States Supreme Court's holding in Wilco v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)); Advest,
Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 9 (1990) (the First Circuit proposed that the "manifest
disregard" language applies to two classes of cases: (1) to labor arbitrations, where an
award is contrary to the plain language of a collective bargaining agreement; and (2)
where it is clear from the record that the arbitrator recognized the applicable law and
then chose to ignore it).
119. Brown v. Rauscher, 994 F.2d 775, 781 (lth Cir. 1993) (the l1th Circuit
provided two justifications for reviewing an arbitral award for arbitrariness and
capriciousness: (1) a determination of whether an arbitral award is arbitrary of capricious
is a legal issue, which a court is well equipped to evaluate; and (2) to remand the case to
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However, Chapter One of the FAA does not directly address the
enforcement of foreign judgments. 12 1 Thus, it is unclear whether Congress
intended the FAA to include jurisdiction over foreign awards. 122 This
nuance is of considerable substantive importance because the intent of
Congress would dictate the scope of the courts' power to vacate or
modify non-domestic arbitral awards. 123 Consequently, there is dispute
as to whether the above-mentioned grounds can be used as a basis for
federal courts to vacate or modify non-domestic arbitral awards rendered
pursuant to Article V of the New York Convention.124 Resolution of this
conflict is important for future enforcement of the New York
Convention.
If the U.S. courts have enforcement power over foreign arbitral
awards under the FAA, then Article VII of the New York Convention is
triggered and federal courts may rely upon local laws to vacate or
modify awards. 25 Alternatively, if Chapter 2 of the FAA limits federal
courts to the express provisions of the New York Convention, then
Article V of the New York Convention is triggered and
arbitral grounds
126
can only be denied on the grounds enumerated therein.

a trial court for further proceedings would defeat one of the main purposed behind
arbitration, which is decide disputes expeditiously).
120. Exxon Shipping v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 11 F.3d 1189, 1194 (the Third
Circuit stated that federal courts can vacate arbitration awards on public policy grounds,
citing a proposition from an earlier Third Circuit case, Ludwig Honald Mfg. v. Fletcher,
405 F.2d 1123, 1128 note 27 (3d Cir. 1969), where the Court held that an arbitral award
could be properly vacated either because it "violates a specific command of some law"
or "because of inconsistency with public policy").
121. Ostrowski, supra note 3, at 1675 (Chapter One of the Federal Arbitration Act
could be read as indicating that cases involving the recognition and enforcement of
foreign awards was not contemplated at the time of the Act's inception; however, this
does not mean that international arbitration is necessarily outside the scope of the Act).
122. Id. at 1676.
123. Id. (If recognition and enforcement of foreign awards is outside of the Federal
Arbitration Act, then the United States would not have prima facie authority to confirm a
foreign award, unless the arbitration agreement specifically provides otherwise).

124.
125.
126.

Qiu, supra note 3 1, at 621.
Ostrowski, supra note 3, at 1677.
Id.

C. Recent FederalCase Law. The Preferencefor Article V or
VII Depends on Which ProvisionFavors Domestic
Citizens and Businesses
In Matter of Chromalloy Aeroservices127 (Chromalloy), the court
employed Article VII to enforce an arbitral award, benefiting a United
States corporation, that had been rendered invalid. Arbitration proceedings
against the Egyptian Air Force took place in Cairo under Egyptian law
and the arbitral tribunal issued a ruling in favor of Chromalloy.128 When
the Egyptian Air Force refused to pay the award, Chromalloy applied to
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for enforcement of
the award. 129 Subsequently, the Egyptian Air Force filed an appeal with
30
the Egyptian Court of Appeal for nullification of the award to Chromalloy.1
The Egyptian Court of Appeal granted the Egyptian Air Force's request
for nullification. The Egyptian Air Force then filed a Motion to Dismiss
31
Chromalloy's petition to enforce the award in the U.S. District Court.
Despite the nullification, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia granted Chromalloy's petition to recognize and enforce the
arbitral award in the United States. 132 This decision creates a conflict
between the power of the rendering country to vacate the award on the
basis of an Article V public policy exception and consideration of the
domestic law by the enforcing country under Article VII of the New

York Convention. 133
The U.S. District Court based its decision on a presumption that
Article VII of the New York Convention enabled it to invoke Chapter
One of the FAA for the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral
award. 134 However, as earlier mentioned, it is not clear whether Chapter

127.

Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic, 939 F. Supp. 907, 908 (1996) (in

Chromalloy, a military procurement contract was enacted between the United States
Corporation Chromalloy Aeroservices and the Air Force of the Arab Republic of Egypt
in 1988. In 1991, the Egyptian Air Force notified Chromalloy that it was terminating the
contract. Consequently, Chromalloy informed the Egyptian Air Force that it rejected the
termination and proceeded to commence arbitration proceedings pursuant to the Contract
between the two parties).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 914-15.
133. Id. at 914.
134. Ostrowski, supra note 3, at 1668; see also Chromalloy, 939 F. Supp. at 914
(the court specifically stated that while Article VII does not eliminate all consideration of
Article V, it requires that the court protect Chromalloy under the domestic law of the
United States; the court further alleged that there was no conflict between the use of
Article VII to invoke the Federal Arbitration Act and the language of the New York
Convention).
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One of the FAA even applies to, or can be invoked in relation to,
foreign-rendered arbitral awards.' 35 Therefore, the use of Article VII of
the New York Convention to import and rely on U.S. domestic arbitration
law only adds to the uncertainty of the enforcement process, which is
36
contrary to the goal of Article V of the New York Convention.'
Further, the use of Article VII to import U.S. law in order to enforce a
judgment, while Article V was used to set aside the judgment on the
basis of local laws in Egypt, creates controversy as
to which country's
37
local laws should take precedence over the others.
Under the Chromalloy court's decision, it appears that the federal
court took the approach that would allow the importation of U.S.
domestic law. While the court's justification was that its decision would
further the international arbitration system and enforcement of arbitral
decisions, this case can also be viewed as an overstepping by the federal
courts to invoke U.S. domestic law rather than Egyptian domestic law.
In Baker Marine v. Chevron,'38 the court utilized Article V to uphold
an arbitral decision of the rendering country. An arbitral panel in
Nigeria awarded Baker Marine judgments against Chevron and Danos.
Baker Marine subsequently applied to enforce both awards in the Nigerian
Federal High Court. 39 Concurrently, Chevron and Danos appealed to
the Nigerian Court to have the awards set aside. 40 The Nigerian court
set aside both the Chevron and Danos judgments. 4 1 Consequently, Baker
Marine applied to the Northern District of New York for recognition and
enforcement of the judgments pursuant to U.S. law. 142 The District
Court denied the application and Baker Marine appealed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 43 The Second Circuit affirmed

135.

Ostrowski, supranote 3, at 1675.

136.

Id. at 1670.

137.
138.

Id. at 1673-74.
Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F. 3d 194, 195-96 (2d

Cir. 1999) (two corporations, Baker Marine and Danos, entered into a contract with
Chevron, whereby an arbitration clause stipulated that all disputes would be settled by
the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
employing the substantive laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Baker Marine
charged both Chevron and Danos with violating their contracts and all parties submitted
to arbitration).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 196.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.

the rulings of the district court and declined to enforce the arbitral
awards. 4' 4
In Baker, the Second Circuit upheld the decision of the Nigerian
Courts on the basis of Article V, thereby respecting the decision made in
the rendering country. Unlike the Chromalloy court, the Second Circuit
chose not to enforce the initial arbitral award. Thus, when confronted
with the exact same situation as the Chromalloy court, the Second
Circuit decided to rely on alternate reasoning in order to achieve a
different result than the Chromalloy court. The Second Circuit reasoned
that arbitration agreements should be treated like all contracts and
suggested that enforcing annulled arbitration awards would violate,
rather than promote, U.S. arbitration policy. 45 The Court recognized
that the refusal to uphold arbitral agreements systematically hindered the
authority of the courts to render decisions and discouraged the use of
international arbitration agreements.
The Baker court, however, did not resolve the interplay between U.S.
arbitration policy and domestic law. If the Chromolloy decision were
followed, Article VII of the New York Convention would require such
an analysis.146 Interestingly, Baker Marine was neither a United States
citizen nor a United States corporation, whereas Chromalloy was. If the
differences in the outcomes of those cases could be reconciled on this
basis, this begs the question of whether the Baker court might have
decided differently had the decision led to a favorable result for a U.S.
citizen. The Baker court even distinguished the Chromalloy case by
147
specifically acknowledging that Baker Marine was not a U.S. citizen.
Thus, within a three-year time period the U.S. federal courts employed
two completely different approaches to arbitration policy.
In Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica (Spier),148 the court purported to
follow an Article V analysis when it upheld a decision by an Italian
court. Italian arbitrators found in favor of Spier and awarded a judgment
of one billion Italian lire. 149 Tecnica challenged the award through three
144. Id. at 197 (the Court warned that applying domestic arbitral law to foreign
awards under the New York Convention would undermine the policy of finality and
would produce conflicting judgments and would encourage forum shopping).
145. Davis, supra note 5, at 51.
146. Id.
147. Baker Marine, 191 F.3d at 197 (the Court specifically drew this distinction
"unlike the petitioner in Chromalloy, Baker Marine is not a United States citizen, and it
did not initially seek confirmation of the award in the United States").
148. Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica, S.P.A., 71 F. Supp. 2d 279, 280-81 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (Spier, a United States citizen, entered into a contract with Tecnica, an Italian
corporation, under which disputes were to be settled by arbitration. Spier alleged a claim
against Tecnica that they had developed a means of production derived from expertise
acquired from Spier, and the matter was submitted to arbitration).
149. Id.
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levels of the Italian court system. All three courts held the judgment
unsupported and nullified the award. 150 Consequently, Spier petitioned
for enforcement of the Italian arbitrators' award in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York. 1 51 The District Court
denied Spier's petition to enforce the Italian arbitral award.15 2
The Spier court's refusal to enforce the arbitral award followed the
reasoning of the Baker court, stating that the United States may only
deny enforcement of an arbitral award on the basis of Article V of the
New York Convention. 53 Because the United States was not the rendering
country, the court held that the award was subject to annulment only
under Italian law. 15 4 The court in Spier, like the Baker court, also did
55
not consider or distinguish Chromalloy's Article VII argument.
Avoiding the implications of Article VII is problematic because, as the
Chromalloy court notes, Article V is a permissive and thus an optional
standard, while the language in Article VII appears to require mandatory
consideration of the local laws of the enforcing country."' Thus, in
interpreting case law and the New York Convention, a resolution as to the
Article V and Article VII conflict is necessary to encourage and promote
international arbitration practices. Such a resolution should also curb the
possibility that U.S. federal courts will manipulate the laws to the
advantage of U.S. citizens, but to the possible detriment of the United
States' international relations.
D. Where Are We After Chromalloy, Baker and Spier?
Currently, the Chromalloy, Baker and Spier cases leave open the
opportunity for the United States to disregard the letter and spirit of the
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 281-82.
Id. at 282.
Id. at 288-89.

153.

Davis, supra note 5, at 53.

154. Id.
155. Davis, supra note 5, at 54 (the Spier court does acknowledge the Chromalloy
decision, but attempts to distinguish the case on the ground that Egypt failed to uphold
their agreement not to appeal an adverse arbitral decision).
156. Id.; see also Chromalloy, 939 F.Supp at 909 (the argument of the Chromalloy
court involves the specific language of Articles V and VII of the New York Convention:
the court contends that the Article V language "recognition and enforcement of the
award may be refused..." is permissive, while the Article VII language "the provisions
of the present Convention shall not affect the validity ... nor deprive any interested
party of any right he may have to avail himself of an arbitral award" is mandatory; thus,
taking precedence over the Article V language (emphasis added).

New York Convention in favor of domestic law. Initially, Chromalloy

set the stage for the controversy by acknowledging the conflict between
Articles V and VII of the New York Convention and attempting to both
interpret and reconcile them. The Chromalloy court applied the Article
VII option to employ local law where it is more favorable because it is a
mandatory provision, whereas the Article V grounds for nullifying an
award are permissive.' 57 While this decision may seem justified, given
the language of Article VII, it deliberately allows the United States to
assert its own domestic law in place of the law of other countries. This
will create greater tension between the United States and countries that
are parties to international arbitration agreements by causing secondguessing as to a decision made based on the laws of one country and
debate over which country's laws should prevail. The Baker Marine and
Spier courts employed Article V to uphold the parties' choice of law but
failed to acknowledge the arguably mandatory language of Article
VII."5 ' Thus, the treatment of Articles V and VII remains unresolved in
how the United States' and other countries' approach the issue. 5 9 Such
disparities in treatment create a lack of consistency in enforcing and
adjudicating international arbitration agreements that could affect the
growth and effectiveness of the international arbitration process.

157. Id. at 75-76.
158. Id.
159. It may appear that Chromalloy is actually an outlier in deferring to the
authority of Article VII and that Baker and Spier are the authority to be relied upon
because they were decided in 1999, whereas Chromalloy was decided in 1996.
However, neither Baker nor Spier overruled Chromalloy nor did they specifically resolve
the conflict between Articles V and Articles VII. Furthermore, the most recent case to
cite either Chromalloy, Baker, or Spier as authority was Karaha Bodas Company v.
PerusahaanPertambanganMinyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 335 F.3d 357, 360-67 (5th
Cir. 2003), which cited to Chromalloy as authority for its holding. In Karaha Bodas, an
Indonesian Company, Pertamina, and a company incorporated in the Grand Caymans,
KBC, had agreed to arbitrate contract disputes in Switzerland. After an award was
granted to KBC, Pertamina sought to have the award annulled in Indonesia and KBC
sought enforcement in the United States. The Fifth Circuit explained that the New York
Convention bestows authority upon an enforcing country (i.e. the United States) to
enforce an arbitral award even where an award has been rendered or nullification
proceedings are accruing in the country where the award was rendered. Accordingly, the
Fifth Circuit utilized Article VII of the New York Convention to rely upon authority
under Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act to enjoin the Indonesian Company,
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, from making repeated attempts to
prosecute in Indonesia in order to annul the arbitral award.
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IV. Is THERE A SOLUTION?

A. InternationalComity and the Debate Over Who Should
Have ControllingAuthority
Choosing to favor either Article V or Article VII of the New York
Convention may turn on the question of what is "competent" authority
on a given matter. 160 The answer to this question depends on who is
better suited to make the decision regarding enforcement of an arbitral
award-the rendering country or the enforcing country. Article V advocates
granting ultimate authority to the rendering country, which has the
advantage of eliminating improper awards at the source and providing
judgments that are consistent with the procedural and substantive laws 1of
61
the country in which the parties contracted to resolve arbitrations.
Additionally, the parties can rely on the expectation that their dispute
will be resolved in one jurisdiction and avoid16one
party's forum shopping to
2
find a court that will enforce the judgment.
At the same time, leaving the ultimate authority regarding arbitral
decisions to the rendering country poses a danger of no correction within
a domestic law vacuum.16 3 Allowing arbitral decisions to be completely
subject to the laws of the rendering country may create a lack of checks
and balances on the international arbitration system. 1 Enhancing the
power of local courts is contrary to the view that international arbitration
is a system that is delocalized and detached from national arbitration
laws. 165 This is the reason that Article VII may be advantageous. However,
Article VII can also be viewed as undermining other countries' legal
tribunals by enforcing the domestic laws of the enforcing country, rather
than the laws of the rendering country where the parties agreed to
arbitrate.

160.

Michael H. Strub, A Proposalfor Effective Guidelines, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1031,

1048 (1990).
161. Ostrowski, supra note 3, at 1662-63.
162. Id. (citing ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION
OF 1958: TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 1-6 (1981)).

163.
164.

Ostrowski, supra note 3, at 1663.
Id.

165.

Ray Y. Chan, A Critiqueof Chromalloy, 17 B.U. INT'L L.J. 141, 152 (1999).

B. The U.S.Constitutionand Enforcement of Treaty
ObligationsandInternationalAgreements
The notion that the U.S. Constitution is the "supreme law of the land"
is a fundamental tenet of U.S. law, society and history. The Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution, found in Article VI, specifically declares that
the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land." 166 Unlike interpretations of many provisions of the
Constitution that are frequently debated because of their vagueness, the
text of the Supremacy Clause is rather clear in its meaning: because
treaties hold equal weight to the Constitution under the Supremacy
Clause, treaties also are the "supreme law of the land.' ' 167 Therefore, the
obligation of the federal courts of the United States to uphold
international treaties, including the New York Convention, as the supreme
law of the land is mandatory, and is a necessary component of our
democratic society.
Despite this obligation, U.S. treatment of treaties in recent years
demonstrates a pattern in which U.S. domestic law overshadows the
importance of treaties and international relations. 168 Should the United
States follow a path by which it does not uphold the tenets of the New
York Convention, the consequences could be detrimental not only to the
promulgation of the international arbitration process, but also to the
sacred notion that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land.
C. A Ploy to Exploit Article VII of the New York Convention?
The Later-in-Time Rule Revisited
Utilizing the doctrine of the later-in-time rule, as applied in the Head
Money Cases, to analyze the recent treatment by the U.S. federal courts
of the New York Convention, reflects a danger that the federal courts
will avoid upholding international treaty requirements despite the
Supremacy Clause. 169 The Head Money Cases and the later-in-time rule

166.
167.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a ConstitutionalFallacy,

36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 46 (2002); see also LouIs HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 1999 (2d ed., Clarendon Press, 1996) (The Supremacy
Clause was designed principally to assure the supremacy of treaties to state law.).
168. Vagts, supra note 11, at 313.
169.

See generally Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES

CONSTITUTION 206 (2d ed., Clarendon Press 1996) (the obligations and authority to
implement a treaty under the Supremacy Clause also implies an obligation and authority
to interpret treaties and to determine what is required by the treaty).
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provide a controversial rationale17 ° for federal courts to rely on as a basis
for justifying the use of domestic law in place of treaty law. The Head
Money Cases would dictate that the federal courts have an adequate
basis to invoke Article VII of the New York Convention and to employ71
domestic law where doing so would lead to a more favorable outcome.'
While use of Article VII may support the policy of enforcing arbitral
awards, such action also has the potential to erode Article V's important
aims of consistency and predictability.
An even greater danger arises if the United States acts in a manner that
takes advantage of Article VII of the New York Convention. Under the
force of the later-in-time rule, the U.S. Congress could conceivably
enact new legislation that is contrary to treaty obligations, and then use
Article VII to employ that new domestic law in place of the international
law. 72 In fact, Senator Jesse Helms, former Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, even stated that the United States' treaty
obligations could be superseded by a simple act of Congress. 173 This
attitude reflects a growing defiance on the part of the United States that
could both offend treaty partners and affect the implementation and
drafting of treaties with State parties in the future.
The backlash the United States has experienced due to previous
breaches of international agreements has not yet been severe; the United

170. Id. at 210 (the later-in-time rule set forth in the Whitney doctrine, see supra
note 67, implies an equality of United States treaties and legislation enacted by
Congress; but the Supremacy Clause says only that treaties and statutes are both the law
of the land, but does not assert that they are equal to each other).
171.
See supra notes 55-56.
172.
Henkin, supra note 169, at 206 (for international purposes, the President
determines the initial view of the United States with respect to a treaty. However,
Congress has opportunity to interpret a treaty either when it is implementing legislation
to enact the treaty or when enacting other legislation that might otherwise be relevant to
the operation of the treaty. Additionally, Congress can evade treaty obligations with
legislation either by enacting legislation inconsistent with treaty obligations or by
repealing legislature acts that were enacted for the purpose or implementing the treaty).
173. Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last in Time Rule for
Treaties and FederalStatutes, 80 IND. L.J. 1, 23, 27 (2005) (the last-in-time rule suggests
that a treaty can be cancelled by a unilateral act of Congress; not only does this
undermine the authority of the Supremacy Clause and the ability of the United States to
uphold their international obligations, but it does so one the basis of a decision of one
branch of the United States government. This also implicates a separation of powers
problem, as the authority to enter into international treaties and executive agreements
rests with the executive branch of the United States government). See also Henkin,
supra note 169, at 106.

States has not suffered significant punishment or consequences. 174 But
this should not serve as validation that the United States is acting
appropriately and prudently. There is a question that still remains
unanswered-where do the Head Money Cases and the later-in-time
doctrine leave the United States with respect to the Supremacy Clause
and foreign relations?
The answer should be a United States that is attentive to its
international treaty obligations and that upholds its "interests" with honor.
In an advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice, a U.S. judge
stated "a State cannot avoid its responsibility by the enactment of
domestic legislation which conflicts with its international obligations.
In order for the United States to maintain an elevated position in world
affairs and with other world powers, the United States must act with
honor by fulfilling the obligations that it represents that it will take
on-thereby
allowing other countries to keep their faith in the United
76
States.1

The "interest" of the United States involves a need to be attentive to
the reactions that would arise from treaty partners as a result of its
noncompliance. 77 While the general response by other treaty
participants to U.S. breaches of international obligations has not yet been
substantially negative, the full picture may not yet be clear. As the
United States continues to commit minor breaches of international
agreements, the credibility of the United States is slowly eroding,
destroying an image of interest and honor that the United States should
be striving to uphold. 178 The U.S. Constitution states that treaties are the
supreme law of the land and take precedence over conflicting domestic
law. However, the Head Money Cases and recent breaches of international
obligations have given deference to domestic law, thereby eroding both
the Constitution of the United States and our relationships with the rest
of the world.
174. See supra notes 46-47.
175.
Id.at 324 (quoting Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section
21 of the United Nations HeadquartersAgreement of 26 June 1947, Advisory Opinion,
1988 ICJ REP. 12, 34, para. 57 (Apr. 26)).
176. Vagts, supra note 11, at 324-25 (one of the explanations for the binding effect
of treaties and their continued use is the reliance on each party to act with honor and in
good faith; even the court in the Head Money Cases used the term "honor" in explaining
the later-in-time rule and acknowledging that some obligation to international
agreements was still incumbent on the United States).
177. Id. at 327 ("interest" refers to the reactions that noncompliance would arouse
in countries who are parties to the international agreement or treaty; the court in the

Head Money Cases was concerned even with the possibility of countries going to war
over breaches of treaty obligations; concerns about war became less likely as the United
States became more and more powerful).
178. Id.at 329.
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D. Article V More Effectively PromotesInternationalArbitration
and InternationalCommercial Transactions
The impact of avoiding responsibilities under international agreements
goes beyond threatening the strength and power of the Supremacy Clause
of the Constitution and treaty obligations with signatory countries. The
protectionist practices of the United States will have a detrimental effect
on the international arbitration system and on business relationships
between the United States and other countries. 79 Pactasunt servanda is
the notion that "every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and
must be performed by them in good faith."' 8 ° Where good faith is not
exercised, both the force of a treaty and the credibility of the breaching

party are compromised.
Treaties act beneficially as a mechanism for enhancing cooperation. 18 2
Much like the notion behind the game theory of the Prisoner's Dilemma, 82
a treaty sets out rules for behavior for the parties to the agreement.
When one party acts opportunistically and then denies violating the
terms of the game, that party's probability of successful outcomes in
future interactions will diminish. 183 The opposing party will distrust the
future behavior of the opportunistic party and may even refuse to engage

179. John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution,
and the OriginalUnderstanding,99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1956-57 (1999) (international
agreements are important to the functioning of the United States in international
commerce: the GATT sets the rules of international trade, which comprises one-third or
the economic activity of the United States; NAFTA, which creates a free market among
the United States, Canada, and Mexico, opens up opportunities for the economic growth
of the United States).
180. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, InternationalAgreements: A Rational
Choice Approach, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 113, 115 (2003) (citing Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties art. 2(l)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333 (entered into force
Jan. 27, 1980)).
181. Id.at 118.
182.

CHARLES B. WIGGINS & L. RANDOLPH LOWRY, NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT

ADVOCACY 21-25 (West Group 1997). The Prisoner's Dilemma describes conflicting
strategies for approaching negotiations. The basic notion is that aggressive bargaining
strategies will allow you to be successful and win a lot in the short-run. Alternatively,
cooperative interaction can bring a double benefit-a better result in the present
negotiation and continued successful negotiations in future dealings. The risk, though, is
that by acting cooperatively, the party you are negotiating with may, in fact, be acting
aggressively and you could lose everything. Essentially, a bargainer has a short run
incentive to act selfishly, but will fare better in the long run be developing a pattern of
mutual cooperation.
183. Goldsmith, supra note 180, at 118.

in future negotiations.' 84 Similarly, the United States' failure to abide by
provisions of international agreements creates an unwillingness of
countries to interact with the United States because of the increased risk
of doing business. 185 This result will spill over to commercial interactions
if businesses in other countries conclude that the risk of contracting with
U.S. businesses is too high. In the long run, the United States will suffer
from a loss of exporting/importing opportunities, diminished influence
in shaping international laws and treaties, and inability to foster positive
foreign relations.
Related to the increased risk of doing business with the United States
is the increased cost of doing business that will result for the United
States. Parties to a contract or treaty will comply with its terms to the
extent that doing so is cost-justified. 8 6 If the United States is noncompliant in its treaty obligations then, as mentioned above, the risk of
doing business and engaging in international agreements with the United
States escalates. As a result, the United States loses credibility, and
convincing other nations to engage in trade or policy agreements will
become more costly. Consequently, continuous violations 87may threaten
the ability of the United States to influence foreign policy.'
In summary, the extent to which the United States upholds or does not
uphold treaty obligations, especially with respect to the New York
Convention, could have an important effect on both the predictability
and fairness of the international arbitration system and the expansion of
the arbitration system to mediate international commerce and trade
relationships.
E. What Now?
Given the United States' recent approach to international agreements
and the deference federal courts give later-in-time domestic law despite

184. Id.
185. Id. (the theory behind the prisoner's dilemma as applied to countries that are
parties to treaty obligations implies that states will refrain from violating treaties for the
following reasons: because they fear retaliation from other states, or because they fear a
failure of coordination (which refers to the notion that when treaties define coordination
actions, it becomes less likely that failure of a treaty will occur because of error), or

because they fear a loss of reputation).
186. Id. at 135 (a particularly important cost is diminishing reputations, which can
result in retaliation; for example, if a state violates its obligation to reduce tariffs under a
free trade pact, then other states may retaliate by refusing to lower their own tariffs).
187. Id. at 136, 142 (this idea is also supported by a rational choice explanation
where international leaders realize that the public internalizes legal norms and ideas that
are set forth in international treaties and agreements; leaders, therefore, must support
these norms or risk being accused of hypocrisy and disloyalty, not only by other parties
to international agreements, but by their own constituents).
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the Supremacy Clause, it is my prediction that the United States will
continue to use Article VII of the New York Convention as a vehicle to
import domestic law at the expense of uniformity in the international
arbitration arena.
It is my conclusion that the more effective way to foster and
encourage international relations is to give deference to Article V over
Article VII where the two are in conflict. Article V poses only very
limited exceptions for invalidating arbitral awards, providing for greater
predictability and uniformity in the international arbitration system.
Greater uniformity in the courts of different countries reviewing arbitral
awards will foster an enhanced sense of fairness for parties to the
arbitration. Additionally, upholding the tenets of Article V better mirrors
the intentions of the parties to international trade agreements to arbitrate
under the laws of the rendering country rather than the enforcing
country. Lastly, there will not be competition between countries in
determining whose law should apply because the occurrence of disparate
judgments being entered in the courts of two different countries will be
minimized.
With respect to all international states that are parties to the New York
Convention, however, both Articles V and VII may be needed for the
188
Convention's continuing functionality. Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle
would suggest that there cannot be a clear conceptual separation of
Articles V and VII of the New York Convention because doing so would
affect the degree of the underlying policies being measured. 18 9 To place
all emphasis on one of the policies underlying Articles V and VII in
order to resolve conflict would necessarily affect the degree to which

188. Daniel S. Goldberg, And the Walls Came Tumbling Down: How Classical
Scientific Fallacies Undermine the Validity of Textualisin and Originalism,39 Hous. L.
REv. 463, 479-80 (2002) (Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle is a theorem from nuclear
physics holding that its is impossible to simultaneously determine an objects exact
velocity and position because the more accurately you measure where the particle is,
the less accurately you will be able to measure where it is going. The Heisenberg
Uncertainty Principle is based on two premises: (1) any observation requires intervention
into the system being studied, and (2) it can never be certain that the intervention did not
change the system in an unknown way).
189. R. George Wright, Should the Law Reflect the World?: Lessons for Legal
Theory From Quantum Mechanics, 18 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 855, 856-57 (1991) (the author
provides an example in the context of the Supreme Court: the degree to which an
asserted right is fundamental or basic cannot be measured without affecting the degree of
what is being measured by the very act of measurement).

that policy even exists.' 90 Furthermore, the goals of upholding arbitral
awards and consistency/predictability may have been integral for the
existence of the New York Convention as a whole: parties to the
Convention may not have initially become signatories if both provisions
and, impliedly, both policies were not present.
In conclusion, both Articles V and VII are important for the continued
existence of the New York Convention. However, the United States will
profit from giving deference to Article V of the New York Convention,
and respecting the legal systems of other countries. Such behavior will
assist the United States in retaining a position of leadership and respect
in creating foreign relations and enforcing treaty obligations in the
future.
AMBER A. WARD

190. Craig M. Bradley, The Uncertainty Principle in the Supreme Court, 1986
DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (1986) (the author contends that any attempt to achieve certainty
regarding any important issue is unlikely to succeed because the process of rendering a
decision will distort the issue decided as well as applicable precedents and doctrines;
additionally, it will have the effect of creating uncertainty in other issues).

